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Abstract. Research in adversarial machine learning has shown how the
performance of machine learning models can be seriously compromised
by injecting even a small fraction of poisoning points into the training
data. While the effects on model accuracy of such poisoning attacks have
been widely studied, their potential effects on other model performance
metrics remain to be evaluated. In this work, we introduce an optimiza-
tion framework for poisoning attacks against algorithmic fairness, and
develop a gradient-based poisoning attack aimed at introducing classi-
fication disparities among different groups in the data. We empirically
show that our attack is effective not only in the white-box setting, in
which the attacker has full access to the target model, but also in a more
challenging black-box scenario in which the attacks are optimized against
a substitute model and then transferred to the target model. We believe
that our findings pave the way towards the definition of an entirely novel
set of adversarial attacks targeting algorithmic fairness in different sce-
narios, and that investigating such vulnerabilities will help design more
robust algorithms and countermeasures in the future.
Keywords: algorithmic discrimination · algorithmic fairness · poisoning
attacks · adversarial machine learning · machine learning security
1 Introduction
Algoritmic Fairness is an emerging concern in computing science that started
within the data mining community but has extended into other fields includ-
ing machine learning, information retrieval, and theory of algorithms [12]. It
deals with the design of algorithms and decision support systems that are non-
discriminatory, i.e., that do not introduce an unjustified disadvantage for mem-
bers of a group, and particularly that do not further place at a disadvantage
members of an already disadvantaged social group. In machine learning, the
problem that has been most studied to date is supervised classification, in which
algorithmic fairness methods have been mostly proposed to fulfill criteria re-
lated to parity (equality) [25]. Most of the methods proposed to date assume
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benevolence from the part of the data scientist or developer creating the classifi-
cation model: she is envisioned as an actor trying to eliminate or reduce potential
discrimination in her model.
The problem arises when dealing with malicious actors that can tamper with
the model development, for instance by tampering with training data. Tradi-
tionally, poisoning attacks have been studied in Adversarial Machine Learning.
These attacks are usually crafted with the purpose of increasing the misclassi-
fication rate in a machine learning model, either for certain samples or in an
indiscriminate basis, and have been widely demonstrated in adversarial settings
(see, e.g., [4]).
In this work, we show that an attacker may be able to introduce algorith-
mic discrimination by developing a novel poisoning attack. The purpose of this
attacker is to create or increase a disadvantage against a specific group of indi-
viduals or samples. For that, we explore how analogous techniques can be used
to compromise a machine learning model, not to drive its accuracy down, but
with the purpose of adding algorithmic discrimination, or exaggerating it if it
already exists. In other words, the purpose of the attacker will be to create or
increase a disadvantage against a specific group of individuals or samples.
Motivation. The main goal of this paper is to show the potential harm that an
attacker can cause in a machine learning system if the attacker can manipulate
its training data. For instance, the developer of a criminal recidivism prediction
tool [1] could sample training data in a discriminatory manner to bias the tool
against a certain group of people. Similar harms can occur when training data is
collected from public sources, such as online surveys that cannot be fully trusted.
A minority of ill-intentioned users could poison this data to introduce defects
in the machine learning system created from it. In addition to these examples,
there is the unintentional setting, where inequities are introduced in the machine
learning model as an undesired effect of the data collection or data labeling. For
instance, human annotators could systematically make mistakes when assigning
labels to images of people of a certain skin color [6].
The methods we describe on this paper could be used to model the potential
harm to a machine learning system in the worst-case scenario, demonstrating
the undesired effects that a very limited amount of wrongly labeled samples can
cause, even if created in an unwanted manner.
Contributions. This work first introduces a novel optimization framework to
craft poisoning samples that against algorithmic fairness. After this, we perform
experiments in two scenarios: a “black-box” attack in which the attacker only
has access to a set of data sampled from the same distribution as the original
training data, but not the model nor the original training set, and a “white-box”
scenario in which the attacker has full access to both. The effects of these attacks
are measured using impact quantification metrics. The experiments show that by
carefully perturbing a limited amount of training examples, an skilled attacker
has the possibility of introducing different types of inequities for certain groups
of individuals. This, can be done without large effects on the overall accuracy
of the system, which makes these attacks harder to detect. To facilitate the
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reproducibility of the obtained results, the code generated for the experiments
has been published in an open-source repository. 4.
Paper structure. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2,
describes the proposed methodology to craft poisoning attacks for algorithmic
fairness. Section 3 demonstrates empirically the feasibility of the new types of
attacks on both synthetic and real-world data, under different scenarios depend-
ing on the attacker knowledge about the system. Section 4 provides further
references to related work. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Poisoning Fairness
In this section we present a novel gradient-based poisoning attack, crafted with
the purpose of compromising algorithmic fairness, ideally without significantly
degrading accuracy.
Notation. Feature and label spaces are denoted in the following with X ⊆ Rd
and Y ∈ {−1, 1}, respectively, with d being the dimensionality of the feature
space. We assume that the attacker is able to collect some training and validation
data sets that will be used to craft the attack. We denote them as Dtr and Dval.
Note that these sets include samples along with their labels. L(Dval, θ) is used
to denote the validation loss incurred by the classifier fθ : X → Y, parametrized
by θ, on the validation set Dval. L(Dtr, θ) is used to represent the regularized
loss optimized by the classifier during training.
2.1 Attack Formulation
Using the aforementioned notation, we can formulate the optimal poisoning
strategy in terms of the following bilevel optimization:
max
xc
A(xc, yc) = L(Dval, θ?) , (1)
s.t. θ? ∈ arg min
θ
L(Dtr ∪ (xc, yc), θ) , (2)
xlb  xc  xub . (3)
The goal of this attack is to maximize a loss function on a set of untainted
(validation) samples, by optimizing the poisoning sample xc, as stated in the
outer optimization problem (Eq. 1). To this end, the poisoning sample is labeled
as yc and added to the training set Dtr used to learn the classifier in the inner
optimization problem (Eq. 2). As one may note, the classifier θ? is learned on
the poisoned training data, and then used to compute the outer validation loss.
This highlights that there is an implicit dependency of the outer loss on the
poisoning point xc via the optimal parameters θ? of the trained classifier. In
other words, we can express the optimal parameters θ? as a function of xc, i.e.,
θ?(xc). This relationship tells us how the classifier parameters change when the
4 https://github.com/dsolanno/Poisoning-Attacks-on-Algorithmic-Fairness
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poisoning point xc is perturbed. Characterizing and being able to manipulate
this behavior is the key idea behind poisoning attacks.
Within this formulation, additional constraints on the feature representation
of the poisoning sample can also be enforced, to make the attack samples stealth-
ier or more difficult to detect. In this work we only consider a box constraint
that requires the feature values of xc to lie within some lower and upper bounds
(in Eq. 3, the operator  enforces the constraint for each value of the feature
vectors involved). This constraint allows us to craft poisoning samples that lie
within the feature values observed in the training set. Additional constraints can
be additionally considered, e.g., constraints imposing a maximum distance from
an initial location or from samples of the same class, we leave their investigation
to future work. Our goal here is to evaluate the extent to which a poisoning
attack which is only barely constrained can compromise algorithmic fairness.
The bilevel optimization considered here optimizes one poisoning point at a
time. To optimize multiple points, one may inject a set of properly-initialized
attack points into the training set, and then iteratively optimize them one at a
time. Proceeding on a greedy fashion, one can add and optimize one point at
a time, sequentially. This strategy is typically faster but suboptimal (as each
point is only optimized once, and may become suboptimal after injection and
optimization of the subsequent points).
Attacking Algorithmic Fairness.We now define an objective functionA(xc, yc)
in terms of a validation loss L(Dval, θ) that will allow us to compromise algo-
rithmic fairness without significantly affecting classification accuracy. To this
end, we consider the disparate impact criterion [3]. This criterion assumes data
items, typically representing individuals, can be divided into unprivileged (e.g.,
people with a disability) and privileged (e.g., people without a disability), and
that there is a positive outcome (e.g., being selected for a scholarship).
Although one might argue that there are several algorithmic fairness defi-
nitions [19] that could be used for this analysis, we selected this criterion for
its particularity of being incorporated in legal texts in certain countries [10,26].
Apart of that, recent studies [11] show how fairness metrics are correlated in
three clusters what means that targeting this criterion will also affect a set of
other metrics with similar strength. In addition to this, authors of [2] used this
metric to illustrate the first of the three historical fairness goals that have been
used to define fairness metrics. Disparate impact is observed when the fraction
of unprivileged people obtaining the positive outcome is much lower the fraction
of privileged people obtaining the positive outcome. Formally, to avoid disparate
impact:
D =
P (Yˆ = 1|G = u)
P (Yˆ = 1|G = p ≥ 1−  , (4)
where Yˆ is the predicted label, and G = {u, p} a protected attribute denoting the
group of unprivileged (u) and privileged (p) samples within a set D. Disparate
impact thus measures the ratio between the fractions of unprivileged and privi-
leged samples that are assigned to the positive class. Typically, one sets  ≈ 0.2
which suggests D ≥ 0.8 for a fair classifier, as stated by the four-fifths rule of
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maximum acceptable disparate impact proposed by the US Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) [10,26]. Thus, in general, we should have D
values closer to one to improve fairness.
For our poisoning attack to work, we aim to minimize such a ratio, i.e., de-
creasing the fraction of unprivileged samples for which yˆ = 1, while increasing
the fraction of privileged users which are assigned yˆ = 1. For numerical conve-
nience, we choose to maximize the difference (instead of the ratio) between the
mean loss computed on the unprivileged and the privileged samples:
L(Dval, θ) =
p∑
k=1
`(xk, yk, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unprivileged
+λ
m∑
j=1
`(xj , yj , θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
privileged
. (5)
Note that the parameter λ here is set to p/m to balance the class priors (rather
than dividing the first term by p and the second by m).
To minimize D, we would like to have unprivileged samples classified as nega-
tive (lower numerator) and privileged classified as positive (higher denominator).
As we aim to maximize L(Dval, θ), we can label the unprivileged samples as pos-
itive (yk = 1), and the privileged samples as negative (yj = −1). Maximizing
this loss will enforce the attack to increase the number of unprivileged samples
classified as negative and of privileged samples classified as positive.
In Fig. 1, we report a comparison of the attacker’s lossA(xc, yc) = L(Dval, θ?)
as given by Eq. (5) and the disparate impact D, as a function of the attack
point xc (with yc = 1) in a bi-dimensional toy example. Each point in the plot
represents the value of the function (either A or D computed on an untainted
validation set) when the point xc corresponding to that location is added to the
training set. These plots show that our loss function provides a nice smoother
approximation of the disparate impact, and that maximizing it correctly amounts
to minimizing disparate impact, thus compromising algorithmic fairness.
2.2 Gradient-Based Attack Algorithm
Having defining our (outer) objective, we are now in the position to discuss
how to solve the given bilevel optimization problem. Since our objective is dif-
ferentiable, we can make use of existing gradient-based strategies to tackle this
problem. In particular, we will use a simple gradient ascent strategy with pro-
jection (to enforce the box constraint of Eq. 3). The complete algorithm is given
as Algorithm 1. In Fig. 1 we also report an example of how this algorithm is able
to find a poisoning point that maximizes the attacker’s loss.
Attack Initialization. An important remark to be made here is that initializa-
tion of the poisoning samples plays a key role. In particular, if we initialize the
attack point as a point which is correctly classified by the algorithm, the attack
will not even probably start at all. This is clear if one looks at Fig. 1, where
we consider an attack point labeled as positive (red). If we had initialized the
point in the top-right area of the figure, where positive (red) points are correctly
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Fig. 1: Attacker’s loss A(xc, yc) (left) and disparate impact (right) as a function
of the attack point xc with yc = 1, on a bi-dimensional classification task. Note
how the attacker’s loss provides a smoother approximation of the disparate im-
pact, and how our gradient-based attack successfully optimizes the former, which
amounts to minimizing disparate impact, compromising algorithmic fairness.
Algorithm 1 Gradient-based poisoning attack
Require: xc, yc: the initial location of the poisoning sample and its label; η: the gra-
dient step size; t > 0: a small number.
Ensure: x′c: the optimized poisoning sample.
1: Initialize the attack sample: x′c ← xc
2: repeat
3: Store attack from previous iteration: xc ← x′c
4: Update step: x′c ← Π (xc + η∇xcA), where Π ensures projection onto the fea-
sible domain (i.e., the box constraint in Eq. 3).
5: until |A(x′c, yc)−A(xc, yc)| ≤ t
6: return x′c
classified, the point would have not even moved from its initial location, as the
gradient in that region is essentially zero (the value of the objective is constant).
Hence, for a poisoning attack to be optimized properly, a recommended strategy
is to initialize points by sampling from the available set at random, but then
flipping their label. This reduces the risk of starting from a flat region with null
gradients [5,23].
Gradient Computation.Despite the simplicity of the given projected gradient-
ascent algorithm, the computation of the poisoning gradient ∇xcA is more com-
plicated. In particular, we do not only need the outer objective to be sufficiently
smooth w.r.t. the classification function, but also the solution θ? of the inner
optimization to vary smoothly with respect to xc [5,18,8,4]. In general, we need
A to be sufficiently smooth w.r.t. xc.
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Under this assumption, the gradient can be obtained as follows. First, we
derive the objective function w.r.t. xc using the chain rule [5,23,18,4,16]:
∇xcA = ∇xcL+
∂θ?
∂xc
>
∇θL , (6)
where the term ∂θ
?
∂xc
captures the implicit dependency of the parameters θ on the
poisoning point x, and ∇xcL is the explicit derivative of the outer validation loss
w.r.t. xc. Typically, this is zero if xc is not directly involved in the computation of
the classification function f , e.g., if a linear classifier is used (for which f(x) =
w>x + b). In the case of kernelized SVMs, instead, there is also an explicit
dependency of L on xc, since it appears in the computation of the classification
function f when it joins the set of its support vectors (see, e.g., [5,8]).
Under regularity of θ?(xc), the derivative ∂θ
?
∂xc
can be computed by replacing
the inner optimization problem in Eq. (2) with its equilibrium (Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker, KKT) conditions, i.e., with the implicit equation ∇θL(Dtr∪(xc, yc), θ) ∈
0 [16,18]. By deriving this expression w.r.t. xc, we get a linear system of equa-
tions, expressed in matrix form as ∇xc∇θL+ ∂θ
?
∂x
>∇2wL ∈ 0. We can now com-
pute ∂θ
?
∂xc
from these equations, and substitute the result in Eq. (6), obtaining
the required gradient:
∇xcA = ∇xcL− (∇xc∇θL)(∇2θL)−1∇θL . (7)
These gradients can be computed for various classifiers (see, e.g., [8]). In
our case, we simply need to compute the term ∇θL, to account for the specific
validation loss that we use to compromise algorithmic fairness (Eq. 5).
Finally, in Fig. 2, we show how our poisoning attack modifies the decision
function of a linear classifier to worsen algorithmic fairness on a simple bi-
dimensional example. As one may appreciate, the boundary is slightly tilted,
causing more unprivileged samples to be classified as negative, and more privi-
leged samples to be classified as positive.
2.3 White-Box and Black-Box Poisoning Attacks
The attack derivation and implementation discussed throughout this section
implicitly assumes that the attacker has full knowledge of the attacked system,
including the training data, the feature representation, and the learning and
classification algorithms. This sort of white-box access to the targeted system
is indeed required to compute the poisoning gradients correctly and run the
poisoning attack [4]. It is however possible to also craft black-box attacks against
different classifiers by using essentially the same algorithm. To this end, one
needs to craft the attacks against a surrogate model, and then check if these
attack samples transfer successfully to the actual target model. Interestingly, in
many cases these black-box transfer attacks have been shown to work effectively,
provided that the surrogate model is sufficiently similar to the target ones [20,8].
The underlying assumption here is that it is possible to train the surrogate model
8 D. Solans et al.
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Fig. 2: Gradient-based poisoning attack against a logistic classifier, on a bi-
dimensional classification task. The classification function and the corresponding
decision regions are reported before (left) and after (right) injection of the poi-
soning samples (red and blue stars in the right plot).
on samples drawn from the same distribution as those used by the target model,
or that sufficient queries can be sent to the target model to reconstruct its
behavior.
In our experiments we consider both white-box attacks and black-box transfer
attacks to also evaluate the threat of poisoning fairness against weaker attackers
that only possess limited knowledge of the target model. For black-box attacks,
in particular, we assume that the attacker trains the substitute models on a
training set sampled from the same distribution as that of the target models,
but no queries are sent to the target classifiers while optimizing the attack.
3 Experiments
This section describes the obtained results for two different datasets, one syn-
thetic set composed of 2000 samples, each of them having three features, one
of them considered the sensitive attribute, not used for the optimization. The
second dataset corresponds to one of the most widely used by the Algorithmic
Fairness community, a criminal recidivism prediction dataset composed by more
than 6000 samples, with 18 features describing each individuals. For each dataset,
we consider both the white-box and the black-box attack scenarios described in
Section 2.3.
3.1 Experiments with synthetic data
The first round of experiments uses synthetic data set to empirically test the
impact of the attacks with respect to varying levels of disparity already found
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Fig. 3: (Best seen in color.) Examples of generated synthetic data sets for different
values of the separation S between groups.Privileged elements (z = +1) are
denoted by circles and unprivileged elements (z = −1) by crosses. Favorable
labels (y = +1) are in green, while unfavorable labels (y = −1) are in red.
in the (unaltered) training data. Data is generated using the same approach
of Zafar et al. [26]. Specifically, we generate 2,000 samples and assign them to
binary class labels (y = +1 or y = −1) uniformly at random. Each sample
is represented by a 2-dimensional feature vector created by drawing samples
from two different Gaussian distributions: p(x|y = +1) ∼ N([2; 2], [5, 1; 1, 5]
and p(x|y = −1) ∼ N([µ1;µ2], [10, 1; 1, 3]) where µ1, µ2 are used to modify the
euclidean distance S between the centroids of the distributions for the privileged
and unprivileged groups so that different base rates [7] can be tested in the
experiments. Then, a sample’s sensitive attribute z is assigned by drawing from
a Bernoulli distribution using p(z = +1) = p(x
′|y=+1)
p(x′|y=+1)+p(x′|y=−1) where x
′ =
[cos(φ)− sin(φ); sin(φ), cos(φ)]x corresponds to a rotated version of the feature
vector x.
Using the generator we have described, datasets such as the ones as depicted
in Figure 3 can be obtained. In this figure, the feature vector x is represented
in the horizontal and vertical axes, while the color represents the assigned label
y (green means favorable, red means unfavorable) and the symbol the sensitive
attribute z (circle means privileged, cross means unprivileged).
We generate multiple datasets by setting S ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}. We then split
each dataset into training Dtr (50% of the samples), validation Dval (30%) and
testing Dtest (20%) subsets. In each run, a base or initial model M is trained.
This model M corresponds to a Logistic Regression model in the first setting
and to a Support Vector Machine with linear kernel in the second scenario.
The regularization parameter C is automatically selected between [0.5, 1, 5, 10]
through cross validation. In theWhite-Box setting, the attack is optimized forM
so that Eq. 1 is minimized in the training set Dtr and Eq. 3 is maximized in the
validation set Dval. In the Black-Box setting, the attack is optimized against a
surrogate model Mˆ, a Logistic Regression classifier, trained with another subset
of data generated for the same value of the parameter S Each of these attacks
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generates a number of poisoning samples. The poisoned model is the result of
retraining the original model with a training set that is the union of Dtr and the
poisoned samples.
The attack performance is measured by comparing the model trained on the
original training data with a model trained on the poisoned data. The evaluation
is done according to the following metrics, which for each dataset are averaged
over ten runs of each attack:
– Accuracy The accuracy on test obtained by the poisoned model is similar
and correlated with the accuracy obtained by a model trained on the original
data. It is important to note that the separability of the generated data is
also highly correlated with the separation between the groups in the data,
creating this effect.
– Demographic parity Measures the allocation of positive and negative
classes across the population groups. Framed within the Disparate impact
criteria that aims to equalize assigned outcomes across groups, this metric
is formulated as:
P (Yˆ = 1|G = unprivileged)− P (Yˆ = 1|G = privileged)
It tends to zero in a fair scenario and is bounded between [1,−1] being -1
the most unfair setting. This metric is correlated with the Disparate impact
metric introduced in Section 2 and has been selected for convenience in the
visual representation of the results.
– Average odds difference The average odds difference is a metric of dis-
parate mistreatment, that attempts for Equalized odds [13], it accounts for
differences in the performance of the model across groups. This metric is
formulated as:
1
2
[(FPRp − FPRu) + (TPRp − TPRu)]
It gets value zero in a fair scenario and is bounded between [1,−1] being -1
the most unfair setting.
– FNR privileged False Negative Rate for the privileged group of samples.
– FNR unprivileged False Negative Rate for the unprivileged group of sam-
ples.
– FPR privileged False Positive Rate for the unprivileged group of samples.
– FPR unprivileged False Positive Rate for the unprivileged group of sam-
ples.
Results shown on Figure 4 show the obtained performance of the attacks
for the generated data. In this figure, the horizontal axis is the separation S
between classes in each of the ten datasets. Analyzing the results, we observe
that the poisoned models increase disparities in comparison with a model cre-
ated on the unaltered input data, across all settings. Additionally, they yield an
increased FPR for the privileged group (privileged samples that actually have an
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the original model against the model generated by the
White-box attack and Black-box attacks, for ten synthetic datasets generated
by different separation parameters (S). Each data point is the average of ten runs
of an attack. We observe that attacks have a moderate effect on the accuracy of
the classifier, and can affect the classifier fairness (demographic parity and odds
difference) to an extent that becomes more pronounced if the original dataset
already has a large separation between classes (larger values of S).
unfavorable outcome are predicted as having a favorable one), increasing signif-
icantly the observed unfairness as measured by the fairness measurements. We
note that the attacks also decrease the FNR of the unprivileged group (unprivi-
leged samples that actually have a favorable outcome are predicted as having an
unfavorable one). This is most likely a consequence of the attack’s objective of
maintaining accuracy and show that this attack is not trivial. If the attack were
only to increase disparities, it would also increase the FNR of the unprivileged
group with a larger decrease in accuracy than what we observe. The decrease of
FNR for the unprivileged group, however, is smaller than the increase of FPR
for the privileged group, as the average odds difference plot shows, and hence
the attack succeeds.
3.2 Experiments with real data
To demonstrate the attacks on real data, we use the COMPAS dataset released
by ProPublica researchers [1], which is commonly used by researchers on Algo-
rithmic Fairness. This dataset contains a prediction of criminal recidivism based
on a series of attributes for a sample of 6, 167 offenders in prison in Broward
County, Florida, in the US. The attributes for each inmate include criminal his-
tory features such as the number of juvenile felonies and the charge degree of the
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current arrest, along with sensitive attributes: race and gender. For each indi-
vidual, the outcome label (“recidivism”) is a binary variable indicating whether
he or she was rearrested for a new crime within two years of being released from
jail.
We use this dataset for two different types of experiments. First, we show
how the attacks demonstrated on synthetic data can also be applied to this data,
and demonstrate the effect of varying the amount of poisoned samples, Second,
we evaluate the transferability of the attack to other classification models.
White-Box and Black-Box poisoning attacks with varying amounts of
poisoned samples. This experiment compares the original model against the
model obtained under the two attack models.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the original model against the model generated by aWhite-
box attack and a Black-box attack, for varying percentages of poisoned samples.
The main difference between both types of attack is that the black-box attack
starts having more noisy behaviour also drastically reducing the accuracy of the
classifier (thus being more easily detectable) when the percentage of poisoned
samples exceeds a certain threshold (about 20%).
Figure 5 shows the results, which are in line with the findings of the ex-
periments on synthetic data. According to the obtained results, both types of
poisoning attacks are is able to increase unfairness of the model with a more
modest effect on the accuracy. Also, an interesting finding is the stability of the
White-Box attack as opposite to the Black-Box attack. Whereas the first keeps
the same trend with the growing number of samples, the later starts having a
unstable and noisy behaviour after adding the 20% of samples, causing for some
cases a more unfair model but also affecting the accuracy of the system in a
manner that could be easily detected.
In Figure 5 we also include an Error-Generic Poisoning Attack [8] for the
Logistic Regression model , which is designed to decrease the accuracy of the re-
sulting model. We observe that this type of generic adversarial machine learning
attack does not affect the fairness of the classifier nearly as much as the attacks
we have described on this paper.
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As expected, computing the obtained performance for all the stated metrics,
(Figure omitted for brevity) can be observed that the effect of any attack in-
creases with the number of poisoned samples. In general, these attacks increase
the False Negatives Rate (FNR) for the unprivileged samples, and increase the
False Positives Rate (FPR) for the privileged samples.
Transferability of the attack.We study how an attack would affect the perfor-
mance of other type of models, simulating different scenarios of Zero Knowledge
attacks.
Specifically, the attacks we perform is optimized for a Logistic Regression
model, and its performance is tested for other models: (a) Gaussian Naive Bayes.
(b) Decision Tree; (c) Random Forest; (d) Support Vector Machine with linear
kernel; and (e) Support Vector Machine with Radial Basis Function (RBF) ker-
nel.
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% of poisoned samples
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
Accuracy
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
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−0.4
−0.3
Demographic parity
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−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
Average odds difference
Fig. 6: Transferability of the attacks from Logistic Regression to other models.
Results are shown on Figure 6, in which each data point corresponds to the
average of five experimental runs. We observe that the attack optimized on a
Logistic Regression classifier has a stronger effect on the Logistic Regression,
Support Vector Machine (for both types of kernel tested) and Naive Bayes mod-
els. In contrast, while it can introduce unfairness through demographic disparity
and average odds difference on a Decision Tree or Random Forest classifier, its
effects are more limited.
4 Related Work
Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks. This work is based on Gradient-
Based Optimization, an optimization framework widely used in the literature
on Adversarial Machine Learning for crafting poisoning attacks [5,16,18,14,8].
Such framework is used to solve the bilevel optimization given by Eqs. (1)-(3),
and requires computing the gradient of the classification function learned by the
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classifier. As a result, poisoning samples can be obtained by iteratively optimizing
one attack point at a time [23].
Measuring Algorithmic Fairness. Many different ways of measuring algo-
rithmic fairness have been proposed [19]. Among those that can be applied in
an automatic classification context we find two main types: individual fairness
metrics and group fairness metrics [12]. The former seek consistency in the sense
that similar elements should be assigned similar labels [9]. The latter seek some
form of parity, and in many cases can be computed from a contingency table
indicating the number of privileged and unprivileged samples receiving a posi-
tive or negative outcome [21]. Popular group fairness metrics include disparate
impact, equalized odds [13], and disparate mistreatment [24].
Optimization-Based Approaches to Increase Fairness. Algorithmic fair-
ness can and often is compromised unintentionally, as discrimination in machine
learning is often the result of training data reflecting discriminatory practices
that may not be apparent initially [2]. When this is the case, training data can
be modified by a type of poisoning attack, in which so-called “antidote” sam-
ples are added to a training set to reduce some measure of unfairness. One such
approach proposes a method to be applied on recommender systems based on
matrix factorization [22]; another is based in the Gradient-Based Optimization
framework used in this work [15].
In addition to methods to mitigate unfairness by modifying training data
(something known as a pre-processing method for algorithmic fairness [12]),
other methods modify the learning algorithm itself to create, for instance, a
fair classifier [26,24] In these works, the trade-off between accuracy and fairness
is approached through an alternative definition of fairness based in covariance
between the users’ sensitive attributes and the signed distance between the fea-
ture vectors of misclassified users and the classifier decision boundary.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
The results show the feasibility of a new kind of adversarial attack crafted with
the objective of increasing disparate impact and disparate mistreatment at the
level of the system predictions. We have demonstrated an attacker effectively
alter the algorithmic fairness properties of a model even if pre-existing disparities
are present in the training data. This means that these attacks can be used to
both introduce algorithmic unfairness, as well as for increasing it where it already
exists. This can be done even without access to the specific model being used,
as a surrogate model can be used to mount a black-box transfer attack.
Studying adversarial attacks on algorithmic fairness can help to make ma-
chine learning systems more robust. Additional type of models such neural nets
and/or other data sets can be considered in the future to extend the work pro-
posed here. Although experiments in this paper are done using a specific tech-
nique based on a poisoning attack, other techniques can be certainly considered.
Other approaches such as causality-based techniques could be explored as future
work.
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